. . . In the present
case, the error lies in making a symmetrical dualism between mental and
physical (or bodily) symptoms, a dualism which is merely a habit of speech and to
which no known observations can be found to correspond. Let us see if this is so. In medical
practice, when we speak of physical disturbances, we mean either signs (for example, a
fever) or symptoms (for example, pain). We speak of mental symptoms, on the other hand, when we
refer to a patient's communications
about himself, others, and the world about him. He might state that he is Napoleon or that he is being
persecuted by the Communists. These would be considered mental symptoms only if the observer believed that the
patient was not Napoleon or that he was not being persecuted[sic] by the Communists. This makes it
apparent that the statement that "X is a mental
symptom" involves rendering a judgment. The judgment entails, moreover, a
covert comparison
or matching of the patient's ideas, concepts, or beliefs with those of the
observer and the society in which they live. The notion of mental symptom is
therefore inextricably tied to the social (including ethical) context in which it is made in much the same
way as the notion of bodily symptom is tied to an anatomical and genetic
context (Szasz,
1957a, 1957b).
To sum up
what has been said thus far: I have tried to show that for those who regard
mental symptoms
as signs of brain disease, the concept of mental illness is unnecessary and
misleading. For what they mean is that people so labeled suffer from diseases of the
brain; and, if that is what they mean, it would seem better for the sake of
clarity to say that and not something else.
MENTAL ILLNESS AS A NAME FOR PROBLEMS IN LIVING
The term
"mental illness" is widely used to describe something which is very
different than a disease of the brain. Many people today take it· for granted
….